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Consent, Estoppel, and Reasonableness:
Three Challenges to Universal International Law,
by Anthony D'Amato, 10 Virginia Journal of International Law 1-31 (1969)
Abstract: Like consent and estoppel, the concept of reasonableness, while failing to provide an adequate
explanation of the source of obligation in customary international law, does play an important psychological role in
adding to the pressure of international norms upon states. The result is to increase the sense of legality of the rules
that are accepted by states as part of "customary international law." This is not to say that each and every alleged
rule of universal international law must contain one or more of the elements of consent, estoppel, or reasonableness
in order for it to be "valid."
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[pg1]Although a very important part of international law is made up of rules found in
treaties, conventions, executive agreements and contracts among nations, the usual image
conjured up by the phrase "international law" is that of a body of rules that apply, or should
apply, to all states irrespective of their explicit consent or "sovereign will" of the moment. If law
were dependent merely upon each state's will, then there could be no violation of the law and the
term would be fictitious.
Something close to fictionalization of universal rules of international law has appeared in
the writings of several prominent scholars who deal with general customary law. For their
theories of consent, estoppel, and reasonableness come very close to conditioning, if they do not
actually condition, the validity of international law upon the wishes of the "defendant" state.
While some degree of acquiescence of the member states of a system is necessary to the
continued effective functioning of the system, a state will from time to time have to comply with
norms with which it may not agree. Further inadequacies of these theories are their singlefactored explanation of the source of obligation in international law and their reliance upon a
single intellectual task, logical deduction.
Nevertheless, these theories—when they are actually applicable—do have a definite
psychological appeal which adds to the felt pressure of international law on the "defendant." The
present paper is an attempt to distinguish, and to show the importance of distinguishing, between
these logical and psychological positions.
I. CONSENT
The idea that a state is not "bound" by a rule of international law unless it had previously
"consented" to that rule is an extreme form of the positivist tradition in international
jurisprudence which flourished in the nineteenth century. Its proponents, who in Lauterpacht's
words had an "exaggerated regard for sovereignty",FN1 tried to explain custom as merely a tacit
treaty, entered into by all the states which [pg2] had consented to the given rules.FN2 In recent
years this position has found important advocates among Soviet jurists who have seized upon the
notion of strict consent as a way either to reject "capitalist" norms or simply, in Professor
Lissitzyn's words, "to pick and choose among the norms of international law."FN3 One of the
leading spokesmen of the Soviet position, Professor Tunkin, has written that "agreement is the
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essence of custom" in that it expresses the "will of a State" to "consent" to a rule and thus
become bound by it.FN4 Some non-Soviet writers have also concluded that consent is at the
basis of custom. MacGibbon, for example, attempts to explain the fundamental dilemma of
custom (that an act is formative of custom if it is undertaken with a conviction that it is already
required by international law) by focusing upon consent and acquiescence. If a state does not
protest the actions of other states, MacGibbon argues that the acquiescence implied by this
failure to protest
seems necessarily to involve the further otiose conviction that participants in the
course of conduct are entitled to act as they are doing; and this in turn appears to
leave little alternative to submission in the belief that submission is obligatory.
FN5
In 1954 Judge Fitzmaurice reached the same conclusion in a more moderately worded statement
that has been frequently quoted:
Where a general rule of customary international law is built up by the common
practice of States, although it may be a little unnecessary to have recourse to the
notion of agreement (and a little difficult to detect it in what is often the
uncoordinated, independent, if similar, action of States), it is probably true to say
that consent is latent in the mutual tolerations that allow the practice to be built up
at all; and actually patent in the eventual acceptance (even if tacit) of the practice,
as constituting a binding rule of law.FN6
All of these views share common ground in the belief that international law does not exist
unless the individual state agrees that it shall exist, and that therefore an individual state is not
bound by anything that it has not consented to. The leading case on customary [pg3] law seems
at first glance to corroborate this position. The World Court in the Lotus Case held that
International law governs relations between independent States. The rules of law
binding upon States therefore emanate from their own free will as expressed in
conventions or by usages generally accepted as expressing principles of law and
established in order to regulate the relations between these co-existing
independent communities or with a view to the achievement of common aims.
FN7
However, on closer inspection, the statement in the Lotus Case may be seen to stand
more for a limitation on the idea of consent than a reinforcement of it. The Court was careful to
talk about aggregate consent; the terms are specified in the plural and not in the singular. This is
a significant point even though it seems not to have been particularly noticed by writers on
consent or custom. For it is in fact harmless to speak of aggregate consent; it is a truism that
international law is the creation of all the states. From a functional point of view, the only
difficulty arises when a claim is made that each individual state—indeed, the defendant state in
any given controversy—must itself have consented to a rule in order to make the rule binding
upon it. One writer who focused upon the distinction between aggregate and particular consent
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was Professor Jaffe, who in 1933 wrote that "consent is given to international law as a system
rather than 'to each and every relationship contained in it."FN8
The Lotus Case made it clear that neither France nor Turkey was going to prevail because
of any notion of particular consent. Rather, the decision turned on whether customary law was
created in four previous municipal-court cases, only two of which involved French vessels and
none of which involved a Turkish vessel.FN9 The World Court has had numerous occasions to
apply customary international law, and yet nowhere has it held as a matter of general customary
law that the defendant state must have consented to the rule in question in order to be bound by
it. The Court has no doubt recognized the importance of the general observation that the very
existence of international law in international claim-conflict situations is at stake in this question
of consent. If the only way a defendant state can be held accountable to law is by proving that
that state consented to the particular rule in question, hardly any case could ever be won by a
plaintiff state. Indeed, most disputes arise precisely because the disputing states have not
specifically consented to the rule at issue. Since the facts of international state behavior
demonstrate the continuing relevance of legal arguments based upon custom, and since the
[pg4] World Court and all other international tribunals have been able upon occasion to reach
decisions against defendant states in the absence of proof that the defendants had consented to
the rules claimed by the plaintiffs, Professor Jaffe's observation seems to be the only possible
conclusion. By the fact of their engaging in international legal argumentation, or by virtue of
their claims of the benefits of international rules relating to boundaries or shared resources, all
states have in fact consented to the international legal system—not to each and every rule in it,
but to the secondary rules of law—formation and the generally accepted mode of legal
argumentation and legal standards of relevance. This consent is, after all, a manifestation of the
self-interest of states to settle a significant number of their international disputes by law, or to
avoid frictions that would otherwise be present if that law depended in each application upon the
consent of the state objecting to the particular application.
A more detailed look at state practice strengthens the validity of these observations. First,
one would suspect that, if the particular consent theory were valid, new states would typically
engage in the practice of making a list of all the international norms they want and of rejecting
the others. But no state has ever done this. Nor have the existing states ever asked a new state,
upon its entry into the family of nations, to consent to existing rules of law. Indeed, it appears to
be a general rule of law, as Lauterpacht pointed out, that a new state "cannot repudiate a single
rule."FN10 Of course, what this means is that a purported repudiation would not be given legal
effect by the other states, not that a new state lacks the physical ability to repudiate a rule.
Further, if new states wanted to repudiate existing rules, a convenient opportunity would
be when subject to suit in an international tribunal. But Professor Waldock observed in 1962:
Nor has any State ever argued before the [World] Court that it was exempt from a
general customary rule simply because it was a new State that objected to the rule.
In the Right of Passage case, for example, it never occurred to India to meet
Portugal's contention as to a general customary right of passage to enclaves by
saying that she was a new State; nor did Poland, new-born after the First World
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War, ever make such a claim in any of her many cases before the Permanent
Court. FN11
This is not to say that the new states have all accepted all the existing rules of
international law with enthusiasm. On the contrary, as Professor Lissitzyn has shown, many of
the new states resent their [pg5] colonial past and assert that some rules, such as those relating to
expropriation, are not binding upon them.FN12 Nevertheless, their attitude even to rules of
expropriation has not in practice been extremist; as Professor Lissitzyn has also pointed out,
when occasions arose for the new nations to support Communist proposals on expropriation of
foreign investments, many did not lend their support.FN13
Broadly speaking, Professor Waldock's observation seems true: "the new States have at
least as much to lose as anyone else from a denial of the validity of existing international law."
FN14 Rather than trying to set up specific exemptions for themselves, which would be an
espousal of the consent doctrine, the new states have chosen to express support of international
law while at the same time working to help change the content of that law so as better to reflect
the needs of the growing numbers of new states. They are working particularly in the field of
treaties and General Assembly resolutions, as pointed out by Professor Bishop in his Hague
lectures of 1965, to change the content of substantive rules.FN15 Even Professor Tunkin, who
attempts to maintain a strict individual consent or "doctrine of agreement" approach, has
conceded that
if a new state enters without reservations into official relations with other states, this
means that it recognizes a certain body of principles and norms of existing international
law, which constitute the basic principles of international relations.FN16
Since no new state has entered with reservations, and since Professor Tunkin has not, and could
not, proclaim which "basic principles" the new states have, in some unstated manner,
“recognized," perhaps even Professor Tunkin might be included among those who really mean
by the consent theory the aggregate consent of all the states to the international legal system and
not particular consent to each and every substantive rule within the system.
A second example of state practice that does violence to the "doctrine of agreement"
supports Kelsen's argument that if an existing state acquires for the first time an access to the sea,
that state immediately becomes subject to all the norms of international law regarding conduct of
states on the seas, without there being any attempt on the part of other states to secure its consent
or efforts by the acquiring state to pick and choose among the norms with which it agrees. FN17
We [pg6] may expect the same result to follow as states in turn acquire the technology to
participate in activities in outer space; they will find awaiting them a fairly well developed body
of legal rules fashioned primarily by the pioneers.
A third example of state practice which calls into question the concept of particular
consent is the remarkable fact that a state's rights and duties in international law, in Professor
Lissitzyn's words, "are not impaired by changes in its law, government, or constitutional
structure, no matter how violent, at least so long as the core of its territory and population remain
the same."FN18 Yet consent, in the sense given by Professors Tunkin, MacGibbon, and
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Fitzmaurice at the beginning of this chapter, is something that is expressed by particular nationstate officials acting as representatives of their governments. It makes no sense to
anthropomorphize "states" to say that a state itself has consented; yet even if the particular
individuals who expressed a state's consent are overthrown in a revolution or defeated in the next
election, the consent is not revoked. Treaties and contracts persist, as well as the state's
obligations to the general body of customary international rules.
Fourth, international law sometimes assumes that a state has consented when in fact it has
not. Treaties of peace, for example, are valid even when imposed upon the vanquished state.
Moreover, a state is bound by a treaty if it has been entered into on the state's behalf by officials
having the apparent authority to bind the state, even if in fact they lacked authority under the
state's own constitution. Article 2, section 6, of the United Nations Charter extends certain
principles to non-Member states. And the World Court's advisory opinion in the Reservations to
the Genocide Convention CaseFN19 has signalled a breakdown of the strict consent theory
where it had hitherto been thought to be especially applicable—in the matter of defining the
parties to a treaty when some of them make reservations not accepted by the others.
Fifth, if the consent theory were truly an expression of an individual state's will to be
bound, logic would require that if a state changes its mind it would cease to be bound. But
international law has consistently given the opposite answer. Thus, for example, a state cannot
get rid of its treaty obligations by passing contrary municipal laws.
Finally, it is interesting to note that in a recent study of state practice as expressed
primarily through domestic judicial interpretations of international obligations, Professor Falk
concludes that the alleged requirement of presumed consent in customary law must be dropped.
FN20 Consent is a vertical verbal rationalization that in Professor [pg7] Falk's analysis does not
accord with the primarily horizontal ordering of authority and power among independent and
relatively equal states in the international system. This conception appears to be closer to the
meaning of the authoritativeness of custom than Professor Tunkin's solipsistic doctrine of
agreement.
When a single term such as "consent" raises such logical difficulties, the temptation
arises to resort to a kindred term to mask some of the problems. Thus, the concept of
"acquiescence" has recently become fashionable. But it is difficult to distinguish meaningfully
between consent and acquiescence, and especially between implied consent and acquiescence.
In situations where these terms are interchangeable, the notion of acquiescence would be
subject to the same infirmities as that of consent. Writers who have attempted to expand the
notion of acquiescence to cover situations falling short of implied consent add no strength to the
concept. MacGibbon, for example, defines acquiescence as "silence or absence of protest in
circumstances which generally call for a positive reaction signifying an objection."FN21 But this
is an ambiguous formula. While it embraces certain clear situations which indeed "call for" an
expression of protest (for instance, an attack on an embassy abroad), it also includes many other
situations in which a state refrains from protesting another state's actions or omissions because
the protest will be ineffective and only serve to annoy the other state. For example, many states
may deplore France's nuclear test series in the Pacific Ocean, particularly in light of the Limited
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Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, which most states have signed; yet only a few states have formally
protested France's actions.FN22 Their silence need not amount to acquiescence, but may rather
be attributable to a realistic political assessment that a diplomatic protest would not deter France
in the slightest but might only serve to worsen relations with France. On the other hand, there
may exist situations where a state issues a formal note of protest but, by failing to take further
steps, has in fact acquiesced. This could occur, for example, when a state expropriates a foreignowned mining company that had paid below-par salaries to local workers and had shipped all
profits abroad. The foreign state may issue a formal diplomatic note of protest on behalf of its
national whose property was confiscated, perhaps because of the pressure exerted domestically
by that national, and may nevertheless "let it be understood" informally that it is sympathetic
with the act of expropriation. From these and many other possible situations, it is evident that
there is no warrant for assuming that a state's silence or failure to protest is the equivalent of
acquiescence.
This conclusion is apparent from the situations MacGibbon himself [pg8] cites. His
examples prove at most that there is non-acquiescence when a state protests; they do not prove
the converse, that discrete circumstances might be defined which "call for" protest.FN23 For it is
very difficult, except in certain clear situations where states normally protest certain types of
acts, to say that protest is "called for" by the circumstances. Further, it is nearly impossible to say
it in a situation that might create a new rule of international law or change an old rule; for such a
situation, by definition, will have no precedents with respect to the practice of protest. In sum,
MacGibbon's definition and use of the concept of acquiescence amount to finding acquiescence
whenever states are silent. This, in turn, amounts to presumed acquiescence, which is not an
analytically useful concept but merely another cumbersome legal fiction.
The vagueness of the term "acquiescence" may account for its use in a related but
different sense, worth examining briefly. This is the notion of acquiescence not solely on the part
of the state directly affected by the actions or omissions of another, but on the part of the
community of states in general. Judge Hudson's fourth criterion necessary for the emergence of
a customary rule of law, set forth in a draft prepared for the International Law Commission, is
"general acquiescence in the practice by other States."FN24 Similarly, Judge Fitzmaurice wrote
of the effect of consent "in the eventual acceptance (even if tacit) of the practice, as constituting
a binding rule of law."FN25 It is evident that what these writers have in mind is the truism that
international law is only that which is recognized as such in the consensus of states. If a given
rule, or the practice giving rise to a rule, meets with objection by the overwhelming majority of
states-not simply verbal objection or notes of protest, but a complete unwillingness to recognize
that rule in all relevant claim-conflict situations—then by definition that rule is not a rule of
international law.
International law is that law which is manifested in the practice of all or most of the
states; in this sense, it is the law that is generally accepted or "acquiesced in" by the international
community. But in functional terms, the notion of acceptance or acquiescence does not normally
help us decide what the rules in the international legal system in fact are. For only a very few
rules can be cited that have actually been "acquiesced in" by explicit expression on the part of the
preponderance of states. The great bulk of primary rules in all their detail owe their existence
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directly to the workings of the secondary rules of law-formation, which themselves are the
manifestations of the use by states of international legal techniques in their claim-conflict
[pg9] situations. It is somewhat misleading to condition the validity of primary rules upon the
acquiescence of other states, for the acquiescence does not relate to the primary rules but rather
to the propriety of the processes (the secondary rules) by which the primary rules were created.
Thus, the concepts of consent and acquiescence tend to become superfluous when they concern
general community attitudes. To say that the community of states has acquiesced is simply to say
that the rule is a valid rule of international law. This was indeed indirectly acknowledged by
Judge Fitzmaurice six years after he wrote the passage previously cited. As Special Rapporteur
to the International Law Commission's study on treaties, he noted that all States can be deemed
to consent to rules embodied in treaties when such rules gain general-currency in international
customary law.FN26 By thus imputing consent to the states, Fitzmaurice attests to its analytic
uselessness.
Despite all the analytical difficulties involved in attempts to find consent or one of its
permutations as the basis for customary law, it is nevertheless important to recognize the
psychological importance of the role played by consent in reinforcing the authoritativeness of
custom. The fact that some states do consent to some rules, the fact that some instances clearly
amount to acquiescence, the fact that many international acts are the result of mutual tolerances,
and even the increasing importance of treaties (which are clear cases of consent) in the body of
international rules, all add to the acceptability of customary rules of international law.
Government officials newly in power, for instance, often find it convenient to explain to their
constituents that the state cannot do certain international acts because the state itself, through
previous government officials, had agreed not to do so. The feeling of having previously
consented to something is a powerful curb on desires to do something else. Hobbes recognized
this in his attempt to show that citizens had constructively consented to the powers of the
Leviathan, and Burke carried the process even farther by arguing that ancestral consent to the
constitution binds the present inhabitants of a state. Apart from the merits of these political
theories, their very existence and fame attest to the psychological importance people attach to the
idea of consent. In international litigation, the attempt is invariably made to find some sort of
evidence that the opponent state at one time consented to the rule it now opposes. In the Status of
Eastern Greenland Case, for example, a mere verbal remark by one foreign minister to another
was given critical importance in establishing one country's consent to the other's sovereignty in
Greenland.FN27 But the frequency of recourse to arguments about prior consent does not
establish the necessity of proving consent in [pg10] each alleged instance of a customary rule;
rather it illustrates the psychological importance of consent, with respect to some rules or to the
international legal system as a whole, that reinforces the authoritativeness of any customary rule.
II. ESTOPPEL
The preceding section concluded that failure to protest does not necessarily amount to
acquiescence. Acquiescence aside, it is nevertheless open for someone to argue that a state's
failure to protest estops it to protest a similar rule in the future. If a state is thus estopped, it is
effectively bound by that rule. That this process might be a complete explanation of why custom
works is the conclusion reached by Dr. Zdenek Slouka in a recent doctoral dissertation entitled
International Custom and the Continental Shelf.FN28 His reasoning warrants close examination.
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In analyzing the concept of estoppel as it might operate in the formation of customary
international law, it is important to look at the essence of its meaning and not at the manifold
refinements grafted onto it by domestic legal systems. McNair in 1924 and Bowett in 1957 tried
to argue that estoppel in international law necessarily contained certain elements, such as the
refinement that the statement in question must have been addressed specifically to the party
relying upon it.FN29 But it is unrealistic to assume that international law would appropriate all
the trappings of domestic legal concepts. A treaty, for example, is quite different from a
municipal-law contract, and neither one has any claim to authority as a reference-point for the
other. Particularly in an attempt to understand the workings of a concept as unique and difficult
as custom, it is important not to get sidetracked by preconceptions derived from familiarity with
domestic law.
The essential meaning of "estoppel" as used by Dr. Slouka is that if a state gives the
impression of going along with a certain practice or rule, perhaps by not protesting against it
when it was convenient to do so, that state should not be allowed later to disavow the practice or
the rule. Unfortunately, Dr. Slouka did not fully develop the concept of estoppel in his
dissertation, as he later admitted, and in future writing he intends to avoid the term and use
instead an "expectation-reliance complex" as an ordering factor. FN30 For the purpose of
analyzing his argument, it is preferable to assume that "estoppel" roughly means an "expectationreliance complex" than to criticize as inaccurate the use of the term "estoppel" and thus be unable
to examine the main argument on its merits.
One additional terminological point needs mention. There are numerous cases dealing
with the acquisition of prescriptive rights, both in domestic and in international law, where
failure to protest is a [pg11] constitutive element in the finding of title in favor of the possessor
or user as against the owner. It would be dangerous to infer anything about customary
international law in general from this specific class of cases. They would be unworthy even of a
caveat were it not for the fact that MacGibbon has made extensive use of the term "estoppel" in
these cases and has implied that his reasoning was applicable to customary international law in
general.FN31 Quite to the contrary, in cases of acquisitive prescription, a finding that the owner
is estopped to protest the possessor's new rights is simply a legal conclusion on the question of
title and not an explanation of why the result was reached.
Moving now to a consideration of Dr. Slouka's thesis, the salient feature of his analysis is
that the concept of estoppel is a thorough, relativistic substitute for the notion of a general
customary law. Dr. Slouka never proves the nonexistence of general law; rather, he assumes that
international legal relationships are made up of a large number of specific bilateral relationships
of varying degrees of legal force. Although he cautions the reader at the outset of his study that
his conclusions pertain only to the area that he has examined-that of the continental shelf-he
conveys the impression that any particularistic study of any given area of "customary law" would
result in the same conclusion of relativity. Indeed, among his conclusions is the generalization
that the role of the factors affecting the emergence of a customary norm "is relative to the
conditions in which those factors operate." FN32 But we should not rest on the observations that
Dr. Slouka has assumed, and not proven, that the law of the continental shelf is made up of a
number of bilateral relationships, or that he has not demonstrated whether his approach with
8

respect to the continental shelf is applicable in other areas. Rather, let us examine his main line
of reasoning to see whether the assumptions he makes are at all persuasive as ways of
approaching a legal problem.
Dr. Slouka's main reasoning concerns three hypothetical cases which might have arisen in
the early 1950's. Had they arisen, they would have tested the legal validity of competing claims
relating to the continental shelf.
A. Hypothetical 1: The United States v. Great Britain
In the first of these hypothetical cases, The United States v. Great Britain, an American
oil company is supposed to have been engaged in the exploration and exploitation of oil on the
outer submarine areas [pg12] adjacent to Abu Dhabi, a British protectorate whose Sheikh had
proclaimed in 1949 his exclusive jurisdiction and control over those submarine areas.FN33 The
oil company decides not to pay Great Britain for exploitation rights, and the United States
espouses the company's claim. What legal arguments could the United States use'?
Dr. Slouka argues that it could not maintain that the submarine areas in question are a res
communis exploitable by the first comer, as such a position would "expressly revoke" the
Truman Proclamation of 1945 in which the United States itself asserted its jurisdiction and
control over its contiguous continental shelf.FN34 Moreover, assuming this hypothetical case
had arisen in 1953, the United States by that time had implemented its continental shelf policy by
various legislative decrees and by administrative practice involving over sixty governmental
agencies. These moves by the United States government, Dr. Slouka argues, created an
expectation on the part of other countries that the United States would not claim any rights on
any continental shelf other than its own. Dr. Slouka finds in this fact a specific estoppel for the
United States to claim oil rights in the area. Secondly, he argues that the United States could not
maintain a res nullius concept of the continental shelf, which would award title to specific areas
of any continental shelf to the effective occupier. For such a claim would officially renounce the
spirit of the 1945 Truman Proclamation, which contained general terms and concepts that
betokened reciprocity. Moreover, res nullius would, if espoused by the United States, cast doubt
upon the legal status of its own contiguous continental shelf. Finally, a British oil company
actually engaged in exploitation off Abu Dhabi by 1953 probably had relied upon the Truman
Proclamation's apparent disavowal of res nullius, and this operates to estop the United States'
claim off the coast of Abu Dhabi.
Although Dr. Slouka has attempted in this case, with admirable specificity, to indicate
how custom works in practice, there are several difficulties. First, a claim by the United States in
apparent contradiction to the Truman Proclamation of 1945 would not "expressly revoke" the
latter; there is no such concept of express revocation either in international law or in the law of
the United States. Nor would such a claim amount to an official renunciation of the terms of the
Truman Proclamation, which after all could be characterized as relating specifically to the
continental shelf contiguous to the United States and not passing on the question of foreign
continental shelves. Even if there was a "spirit of reciprocity" in the Proclamation, this may have
been wholly gratuitous. At best, Dr. Slouka's [pg13] arguments amount to a position that it
would be unwise as a matter of policy for the United States to espouse the oil company's claim,
9

not that such an espousal would be insufficient in law. To this extent he is of course right, for his
case is purely hypothetical; the United States never espoused such a claim.
Second, even though American companies, with American administrative and legislative
support, were busy exploiting the American continental shelf, this fact is not sufficient to explain
why the United States would be estopped to make a claim on behalf of an American company
attempting to exploit a foreign continental shelf. Analogously, many American firms have built
manufacturing plants in foreign countries; the mere fact that they first built plants in the United
States does not estop the United States from attempting to protect their foreign plants from
confiscation.
Third, we must not lose sight of the fact in Dr. Slouka's hypothetical case that the
American oil company had already established itself off the coast of Abu Dhabi and had begun
the exploration for and exploitation of oil. Great Britain had not prevented the construction of the
drilling rigs. What reliance interest, therefore, does Great Britain have? It expects to be paid for
the exploitation, but this is hardly a reliance interest; if it were, then all plaintiffs would win all
cases involving monetary claims. On the other hand, if Great Britain could show that it refrained
from exploiting the exact areas occupied by the American company because of reliance on the
Truman Proclamation and the "spirit of reciprocity," then perhaps there would be an estoppel.
But this would be exceedingly difficult to prove in 1953 when many areas were available for
exploitation and only few were actually utilized. Indeed, the presence of a British company also
drilling for oil off Abu Dhabi indicates that the American company was not occupying the only
possible position for a drilling rig.
A fourth, and perhaps even more basic, difficulty with Dr. Slouka's analysis is that it
proceeds on the assumptions that res communis and res nullius positions are relevant
alternatives. But this introduces general international law into what Dr. Slouka had attempted to
keep as a pure bilateral situation. Dr. Slouka assumed that the United States, if it wanted to back
the oil company's claim, would have to adopt either a general res communis or a general res
nullius position with respect to all continental shelves. Why could not the United States adopt
instead a completely relativistic position that there are no general legal alternatives, that there are
only specific situations, and in one of them the United States owns its own continental shelf
while in another it has the right to exploit the one off Abu Dhabi? Such a position might seem
unwise or even greedy; on the other hand, it might strike some as reasonable, if account is taken
of the community interest in the rapid exploitation of accessible oil deposits by the most
technologically able states. But wise or unwise, such a policy is not [pg14] necessarily illegal if
analyzed in the vacuum of a purely bilateral approach to international customary law.
B. Hypothetical 2: Great Britain v. Japan
Some or all of these difficulties may have led Dr. Slouka to formulate a second
hypothetical case. In this case, Great Britain v. Japan, the facts are the same as in the first case
with the exceptions that a Japanese oil company is substituted for the American company, and
that Japan had not by 1953 made any declaration with respect to the continental shelf issue. On
this change of facts, no estoppel can be found that might be based on Japan's positive acts. Yet,
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asks Dr. Slouka, could Japan be estopped by its failure to protest, because it had no easily
exploitable shelf of its own, the continental shelf claims of others?
Although Great Britain might argue that there is an estoppel based on the Sheikh's
assumption of exclusive jurisdiction and control in 1949, Dr. Slouka states that Japan would
prevail in this case. He points out that four years is an insufficient lapse of time to raise an
estoppel in light of the fact that the Sheikh's declaration was not accompanied by overt
manifestation of control. Nevertheless, a court might be persuaded by the British position absent
a Japanese allegation that there exists a general positive rule relating to the continental shelf in
international law—either the res communis or the res nullius rule. But as soon as this is
acknowledged, we find ourselves once again in the realm of general customary law and out of
the purely bilateral relationship posited by Dr. Slouka, as he in this instance admits. FN35
C. Hypothetical 3: Norway v. France
In order to test whether any such general rule exists, Dr. Slouka invents another
hypothetical case arising in 1953: Norway v. France. In this third case a Norwegian fishing
vessel collides with an oil-drilling platform or rig that is insufficiently equipped with warning
devices. The rig is located on the continental shelf adjacent to France but outside of French
territorial waters or contiguous zones. Although France had notice that the rig was being
constructed, in line with its official attitude on the continental shelf that no general rule of
customary international law existed with respect to the shelf, Dr. Slouka posits that France in
1953 would not have officially acknowledged the existence of the rig. Norway, too, had taken
such a position on the non-existence of a general rule of customary international law on
continental shelves. Now the question is whether Norway could obtain redress against France
under the theory that France had an obligation to enforce reasonable safety standards on rigs in
its continental shelf waters. Dr. Slouka answers his question in the negative: "by its own
[pg15] continental shelf policy, Norway was estopped vis-a-vis France—a country maintaining a
similar stand-to claim French negligence." FN36
But wherein lies the estoppel here? Norway had done nothing; it had not even issued an
official declaration on the subject. The only evidence given by Dr. Slouka as to Norway's
attitude on the continental shelf problem was the Norwegian position at an international
conference in 1958 (five years after the hypothetical case) that no general rule of customary law
existed with respect to the shelf.FN37 Even if we are willing to assume, along with Dr. Slouka,
that Norway's expressed attitude in 1958 accurately reflects its unstated attitude in 1953, it is not
clear why such an attitude would be inconsistent with Norway's claim in the hypothetical case.
Norway could argue that France, as the nearest coastal state, had a duty (as agent of the
international community) to enforce reasonable safety precautions even in the high seas. In the
alternative, Norway could claim that while the continental shelf itself did not belong to France,
that portion of it tapped by the oil rig had a more genuine link with France than with any other
state. Finally, as a more general point, it is not an accepted practice in international law that
when a state expresses an opinion on the non-existence of a general customary rule that it is
effectively barred from making specific claims that might be inconsistent with that general
opinion. For the state might plead that it incorrectly stated the non-existence of the general rule;
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or it might argue that the specific instance did not occur to its officials when they issued a
general opinion, and if it had they would have appropriately modified the opinion.
Additionally, it is difficult to see how Norway's unstated attitude in 1953 could have been
relied upon by France. Neither France nor Dr. Slouka could have known prior to 1958 what the
Norwegian attitude was. Moreover, is it reasonable to assume that, if the hypothetical case had
actually arisen, Norway would have expressed an attitude in 1958 contrary to its stand in the
1953 case? This question underscores the unreality of the hypothetical case method used by Dr.
Slouka in this instance, for he assumes that real-life conditions would not change after history
itself has been hypothetically changed. Such an assumption is even more questionable if the
position of France is considered. If the drilling rig actually existed off the French coast in 1953,
France might very well have decided not to contest the Norwegian claim for damages. For the
mere existence of the rig would point to a level of profitability of offshore oil drilling that would
greatly exceed [pg16] the price that France might have to pay to Norway for the damage to its
fishing vessel. Indeed, the actual installation of a rig might itself have convinced France to
declare its exclusive jurisdiction and control over the continental shelf off its coast, and perhaps
to see to it that warning devices were placed on the rig.
D. Beyond the Hypotheticals
The difficulty with Dr. Slouka's use of hypothetical cases to demonstrate an expectationreliance complex is that the cases either would not have arisen in the manner in which he
describes, or that subsequent conduct of the states in question would have or could have been
different if the cases had actually arisen as described. The actual practice of states demonstrates
that up through the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf not a single state—not
even Japan FN38—had protested any of the claims to the continental shelf nor had taken any
position in any international litigation for or against any person, company, or state engaged in
any of the exploration and exploitation activities. Nor had any state claimed or established for
itself exclusive rights to exploit the resources of a continental shelf adjacent to another
state.FN39
Nevertheless, one might well ask how the uniformity of state practice just described came
about if not by the estoppel process as illustrated in Dr. Slouka's hypothetical cases. The simple
answer may have been furnished as early as 1950 by Lauterpacht, who argued that the regime of
the continental shelf expressed an established rule of general customary international law. FN40
The uniformity of state practice would thus have been a manifestation of the consensus as to the
general rule. Lauterpacht pointed in 1950 to a certain pressure in the direction of exclusive
coastal state jurisdiction and control over the continental shelf (and concomitant responsibility
for the safety of navigation with respect to oil drilling platforms). This pressure might have been
changed by contrary state actions after 1950, but in fact such actions did not take place and
therefore the basic rule was reinforced. Even Dr. Slouka admitted the existence of a certain
pressure by saying that "it was indeed highly reasonable to expect in 1950 that the doctrine of
exclusive coastal shelf rights would eventually mature into a general legal system." FN41 But
who is to say whether and when a law has "matured," and what in any case would be the
relevance of such a determination? Even an incipient rule may have functional utility if
compared to no rule at all.
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If some pressure existed by 1953 in the direction of the legality of exclusive coastal shelf
rights, all the hypothetical cases suggested by [pg17] Dr. Slouka are easily resolved. Great
Britain would prevail in each of the first two, not by virtue of a claimed estoppel against the
United States or an attenuated version of such an estoppel against Japan, but simply because of
the pressure of the general rule of customary law. That general rule would apply to all states, and
one need not look for special bilateral relationships between states. Of course, in Dr. Slouka's
second case, involving Japan and Great Britain, no such special bilateral relationship existed. In
the third hypothetical, Norway would not have been estopped to institute a claim against France;
indeed, France might have welcomed the claim if based on a general rule of customary law
giving France exclusive jurisdiction and control over the adjacent continental shelf.
Nevertheless, the question still remains as to how the general customary rule of adjacent
state rights to the continental shelf arose in the first place. Lauterpacht in 1950 suggested a
variety of arguments, including, interestingly, the idea of "estoppel" linked with a "failure to
protest." FN42 Lauterpacht's basic difficulty was to discover how a unilateral declaration by a
state, such as the Truman Proclamation of 1945, could result in the formation of a general rule of
customary law when the overwhelming consensus among publicists holds that a unilateral
declaration is merely a claim having no substantive impact upon the rights and obligations of
other states. Lauterpacht might have argued that an exception to this general consensus exists
when the case is one of acquisitive prescription. In such a case, a unilateral declaration is a claim
of ownership; in particular, with respect to the continental shelf, it may be the only feasible
symbolic act FN43 that a state could make inasmuch as the territory in question is submerged
under the high seas. Here, also, the function of protest on the part of other states would not be to
reserve a general legal position but to rebut the particular inference of undisputed possession by
the state making the unilateral declaratory claim. Although in this line of reasoning the role of
protest is significant, the outcome does not yield a general rule of customary international law
but rather establishes individual proprietary rights. Thus this reasoning was not used by
Lauterpacht, who wanted to prove the existence of customary law in general and not, to take an
example, American ownership of its continental shelf in particular.
Accordingly, Lauterpacht chose to argue that the general failure to protest a few
unilateral declarations by states claiming exclusive rights in continental shelves amounted to the
acknowledgement of a general customary rule recognizing such exclusive rights. But if the
unilateral declarations in themselves did not affect the international rights of other states, why
should the others have protested the declarations? What if a state unilaterally declares its
sovereignty over [pg18] the Atlantic Ocean? Must the other states protest such a claim in order to
defeat it? Lauterpacht does not want to go this far; he writes that if a unilateral declaration is "so
patently at variance with general international law" as to render it "wholly incapable of becoming
the source of legal right" then there is no need for other states to protest it.FN44 He mentions as
an example a claim to the exclusive use of the high seas, such a claim being "so tainted with
nullity ab initio" that protest is unnecessary.FN45 The vagueness of Lauterpacht's language is
obvious. Who is to decide what is "so patently at variance" or "so tainted with nullity"? What
seems patent to one observer might seem modest to another. Two directly relevant illustrations
might be considered. First, the United States in 1954 claimed the exclusive use of a large portion
of the high seas for nuclear weapons tests. Could Lauterpacht cite the failure of non-communist
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states to protest the nuclear weapons tests as demonstrating the "patent" illegality of the tests? Or
does it demonstrate their legality in light of the claim that the exclusive use of a large portion of
the high seas was only temporary? Second, does the absence of protest of unilateral claims to the
continental shelf demonstrate the legality of the claims, as Lauterpacht argues? Or might it
demonstrate their patent illegality in light of the fact that vast underseas areas were involved
which some writers had previously thought were linked with the concept of free seas and not at
all subject to national appropriation? FN46 Lauterpacht offers no criteria for distinguishing
between these contrary possibilities.
Nor are Lauterpacht's general arguments on the role of protest in international law
persuasive enough to prove that the failure of states to protest unilateral continental shelf
declarations was formative of a general rule of international law. He argues that because courts
of compulsory jurisdiction are often unavailable in international law, one of the only ways for a
state to avert injury is to protest another state's intention to violate the law as expressed in that
other state's unilateral declarations. And he finds "numerous examples" of protests in
international law. FN47
There are, however, several basic objections to Lauterpacht's position. In the first place, a
unilateral declaration does not itself involve a breach of international law; at worst it is an
expression of a state's intention to commit such a breach. A state may never follow up its unilateral declaration with the threatened act; Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador, and El Salvador, for
example, have never attempted forcibly to implement their declarations of exclusive fishing
rights in territorial seas off their coasts of 200 miles in breadth (although Peru has, and stands
[pg19] as an exception). Since the declaring state might not follow through on its unilateral
declaration, it is not generally considered prudent for other states to issue notes of protest
whenever a questionable unilateral claim is made. Professor Bilder's account of the activities of
the Office of Legal Adviser to the United States Department of State does not even mention a
function of reacting to unilateral declarations of other states by way of notes of protest, which are
normally actuated upon the application of aggrieved persons or corporations.FN48 In the
preceding section, it was argued that protests will often be ineffective and hence are not made for
that reason, or that they may be issued for "face-saving" reasons that in fact acknowledge an
unwillingness to object more effectively.FN49 Particularly in the case of a unilateral declaration,
a note of protest would appear to represent a failure of "quiet diplomacy" to get the issuing
government to change its mind. Their use in this case would not appear to be a typical practice of
states as Lauterpacht suggests.
What are the "numerous examples" of protest in international law cited by Lauterpacht?
He only cites five cases, four of them arbitrations and two out of the four involving prescription.
FN50 Additionally he cites an example involving an alleged breach of neutrality; and indirectly
(by citing Oppenheim's treatise) he refers to a few incidents of protests relating to violation of
rules of warfare.FN51 Most of these citations are irrelevant to the matter of unilateral
declarations, an indication of the necessity to search far afield merely to list examples of notes of
protest. Of course, many other examples could be adduced by simply paging through foreignoffice papers. But these represent only the smallest fraction of inter-governmental
communications and an unimportant part of international relations. Indeed, they represent only a
small fraction of all the possible protests that might have been made but never were formulated.
14

Foreign offices are not in the business of antagonizing other governments by issuing streams of
protests, particularly when other governments issue questionable unilateral declarations or pass
organic legislation that might someday result in a transgression of international law if
implemented. It is thus unrealistic for Lauterpacht to claim that governments are estopped if they
fail to protest all the unilateral declarations of other governments that fall short of "patent"
illegality.
Thus, the idea of estoppel has not yet been persuasively demonstrated to "explain" the
workings of international custom. Nevertheless, estoppel and failure to protest may be highly
suggestive in directing attention to the operative features of custom. First, the fact that
[pg20] Dr. Slouka's first case was more persuasive than the other two may be due to the
allegations that the United States had acted administratively and legislatively to implement the
Truman Proclamation and that a British oil company had set up a rig in the continental shelf off
Abu Dhabi. Tangible acts were in evidence, and not merely unilateral declarations. In the other
cases, it was harder to find "estoppel," perhaps because of the fundamental ambiguity of
unilateral declarations (or the failure to make such declarations!)—they might or might not be
implemented in practice, according to the discretion of the declaring state. Since the declaring
state itself is not "bound" by its own statement (which it may withdraw or simply fail to
implement), no other state can know for sure whether it should or should not rely on such a
statement. However, Great Britain in the first hypothetical case may have relied more upon the
administrative and legislative implementation of the Truman Proclamation than upon the
proclamation itself. Thus the concept of estoppel may help us focus on physical actions of states
as opposed to their statements of intent. Secondly, if a "precedent" is established by the actions
of a state, the notion of "estoppel" certainly reinforces the sense of "bindingness" or
authoritativeness of the incipient customary rule. A state which actually does something which
may have repercussions in the realm of customary international law can be said to be "estopped"
to allege a contrary rule later. Of course this use of the idea of estoppel is not necessary to an
analytic appreciation of the elements of custom-formation, but it may help reinforce the
legitimacy of the process in a psychological sense. Nor can the idea of estoppel tell us which acts
by states may have customary international law repercussions. That does not render it
superfluous to say that estoppel may be linked with each valid instance of custom-formation to
add to the persuasiveness of the secondary rule, but the impact is again psychological.
III. REASONABLENESS
As some writers tried to make consent or estoppel the sole basis for their views of
customary law, so too Professor McDougal has attempted to assign to the concept of
"reasonableness" this central role. Arguing that national decision-makers operating in the
international environment must constantly make policy choices between complementary
prescriptions, he writes that
for all types of controversies the one test that is invariably applied by decisionmakers is that simple and ubiquitous, but indispensable, standard of what,
considering all relevant policies and all variables in context, is reasonable as
between the parties. FN52
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[pg21] It is of course important not to take this statement too literally. Presumably Professor
McDougal would not intend it to apply to fixed treaty obligations that in the short run seem to
one party to be unreasonable. Moreover, in other writings he does not appear to reiterate the
claim that all decisions are reasonable. Nevertheless, he does appear to equate his concept of
reasonableness with the traditional concept of custom in international law. By "international
custom" Professor McDougal specifically means
that total flow of explicit communications and acts of collaboration among
peoples which create community-wide expectations that certain uniformities in
decision will successfully survive challenge.FN53
This too is an overly broad and inclusive statement, one which might well serve as a tautological
definition of "law" as well as custom, and also of the terms "prescription" and "authority" which
appear so often in Professor McDougal's writings. But here Professor McDougal perhaps is
purposefully broad as he views “custom" as only one, even if it is the most basic,FN54 of a
number of "past communications" to which national decision-makers may turn for guides to
policy-making and indications of relevant community expectations.FN55
In the course of his writings, Professor McDougal makes a number of arguments for
"reasonableness" as the authoritative guide to the prescriptive requirements of international
custom. Some of these are purely descriptive of international claim-conflicts, such as the
concepts of reciprocity, retaliation, and dedoublement fonctionnel. As such, they do not prove
Professor McDougal's case for reasonableness. For although it is true that competing claims are
often settled by "mutual tolerances" based on expectations of reciprocity or fear of retaliation,
FN56 their resolution does not have to be "reasonable." A larger power may prevail over a
smaller one that cannot communicate as credible a threat of retaliation; reciprocity may be nonexistent (e. g., the United States has a continental shelf but Japan does not); or the mutual
toleration may maximize the interests of the immediately affected parties against larger
community interests. In addition, the idea of dedoublement fonctionnel—where "the same nationstate officials are alternately, in a process of reciprocal interaction, both claimants and external
decision-makers passing upon the claims of others"FN57— does not assure that the officials will
gradually become fairer and more reasonable by moderating their own country's claims and
meeting [pg22] external claims halfway. Many officials simply become more hardened in a "my
country, right or wrong" attitude.
Apart from the description of claim-conflict behavior, Professor McDougal advances a
number of interpretive arguments on behalf of "reasonableness." First, customary rules tend to be
"formulated at the highest level of abstraction" and hence are "ambiguous in highest degree."
FN58 The implication is that policy-makers have a wide ambit of choice within these broad
rules, and therefore do what is "reasonable." But the conclusion does not necessarily follow, as
we can see from Professor McDougal's own writings. For example, the very broad or even
ambiguous international rule of aer clausus has led, at a great economic loss, to the
establishment of national airlines operating over international air routes. " Among all the
stultifying ingredients of egocentric aerial nationalism," Professor McDougal observes, "this has
probably been the most irrational."FN59 Clearly, then, he does not view aer clausus as yielding
reasonable policy decisions in the same manner as he views mare liberum, though both are
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clearly norms of custom. With respect to freedom of the seas, as a second example, Professor
McDougal finds the inclusion of the "genuine link" theory in Article 5 of the Geneva Convention
on the High Seas "drastic," "mis-conceived," "uneconomic," "positively dangerous," and
"unnecessary."FN60 Yet the Convention was the result of a shared consensus and mutual
toleration of many national views as perceived by lawyers and national representatives, a fact
that might lead one to suspect that what is "reasonable" to Professor McDougal may not be so in
the views of the international claimants whom he is purporting to describe.
This leads to Professor McDougal's second interpretive argument: that international
claimants share a certain set of values, identified in Lasswellian terms as security, wealth,
respect, enlightenment, well-being, affection, and rectitude. FN61 One could only hope that this
neo-philosophy position were true. But as Professor Woetzel has observed, "policy-oriented
approaches with other goals than human dignity, such as Marxism-Leninism" lead to different
results and would "vitiate expectations of reciprocity in terms of general rules governing all mankind." FN62 Moreover, if the Lasswellian values were universally shared, then the arguments of
the chief interpreter of those values, Professor McDougal, would also be universally accepted.
But even a Western observer such as Professor Falk has found unpersuasive Professor [pg23]
McDougal's briefs in support of "the legality of the use of force by Western states in cold war
contexts." FN63
The root of the problem may involve an age-old device of political philosophers, who
have attempted to add to their own persuasiveness by claiming that the norms they set forth to
govern behavior are in fact obeyed in practice by mankind in general. Marx, Hobbes, Hegel, and
Austin, among many others, have attempted to show "scientifically" that what ought to be the
case is in fact the case, and nothing the reader may do will derail the historical inevitability
perceived by the writer. So too Professor McDougal argues that the Lasswellian values not only
should be accepted by all reasonable and decent men, but in fact they are so accepted throughout
the world. What, then, if someone rejects them? Professor McDougal would consign such men to
the extra-legal world, just as Rousseau, for example, solved the problem of dissent in his Social
Contract by banishing the dissenters from the body politic.
This process obviously defines away the objectors, but in so doing defeats its own claim
of universality. Perhaps Professor McDougal wants to do this; perhaps he wants to say, for
example, that the Soviet Union or Red China should not be allowed to participate in the world's
legal system. But the trouble with this approach is that, normally, it is the dissenter on any given
legal issue whom we are trying to persuade. In his famous essay on the hydrogen bomb tests, for
instance, there is no need to persuade the United States that the tests are legal since the United
States claimed that they were legal. But there was need to persuade the Soviet Union and other
states who did not agree with the claim of the United States and probably also did not share the
Lasswellian values.
There are even greater problems in attempting to specify exactly where the valuesassuming they are shared-point with respect to concrete cases. In the first place, taken
individually, they are vague. Does the value of "wealth" mean that a country may expropriate
without paying compensation the assets of aliens doing business in that country so that the
people may increase their "wealth," or does it mean that there should be no such confiscation
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because the country in the long run will become poorer if it does so? Does the value of
"rectitude" mean that a student should burn his draft card because he feels the war in Vietnam is
immoral, or does it mean that the United States government alone may define the morality and
rectitude of its foreign policy? Does a nation increase in respect if it displays its armed might
abroad, or is there an increase in respect if it refrains from using its military power? Indeed,
should we answer the previous question by resort to survey techniques to determine in what way
a nation can increase its stock of respect? What if it were found, for example, that dropping
nuclear weapons on North Vietnam would [pg24] definitely increase Asian "respect" for Old
Glory? If such a finding could be established by statistical techniques, would Professor
McDougal go along with it? Secondly, it is easy to imagine instances where one value would
contradict another. "Affection" may be incompatible with "security," "wealth" with
"enlightenment," and so forth. One's problems may indeed increase if their solution appeared to
depend upon the definition of incompatible values.
Professor McDougal's third argument—the complementarity of customary
prescriptions—shares some of these difficulties also. He contends that rules of custom come
often in paired opposites, thus affording wide discretion to the policy maker. While this
contention does not necessarily mean that the policies selected will be reasonable, nevertheless it
renders the impact of customary prescription so feeble that the reader is inclined to grab hold of
any straw, such as that of "reasonableness," in order to put some meaningful content into
international law. Thus it is important to trace Professor McDougal's contention in some detail.
In the hydrogen-bomb essay, Professor McDougal describes the regime of the high seas,
"a living, growing, customary law," as presenting a "maze of conflicting claims" categorizable
under two sets of complementary prescriptions. FN64 The first prescription is that of "freedom
of the seas," invoked to honor inclusive claims such as navigation, fishing, and cable-laying. The
opposite set of claims are those of exclusive jurisdiction, summed up "in a wide variety of
technical terms such as 'territorial sea,' 'contiguous zones,' 'jurisdiction,' 'continental shelf,' " and
so forth.FN65 Out of the dialectics of these antithetical prescriptions, Professor McDougal offers
a synthesis justifying the temporary exclusive use of a portion of the high seas for the American
hydrogen bomb tests. The complementarity of the prescriptions, in short, forced American
decision-makers to consider "security" goals of the United States and the "free world" and
resulted in a decision that infringed temporarily but reasonably upon the set of interests characterized as "freedom of the seas." FN66 The hydrogen bomb tests, in Professor McDougal's view,
were "reasonable, and hence lawful." FN67
One important difficulty with the apparatus of complementary prescriptions just
described is that it proves too much. If national decision-makers are actually subject to
complementary prescriptions, they may do whatever they desire to do in their unfettered
discretion. Hopefully they will be "reasonable" and perhaps espouse Professor McDougal's
values, but in fact they may often do what they feel is "reasonable" and what Professor
McDougal would describe as irrational. Of course, if by his doctrine of complementary
prescriptions Professor [pg25] McDougal is merely trying to say that there is no international law
at all, then he has picked a rather cumbersome way of doing so. Moreover, the doctrine proves
too much even in terms of his essay on the hydrogen bomb tests. For the bulk of the essay is a
careful description of the minimal intrusions upon free fishing and navigation that accompanied
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the United States' tests. Professor McDougal shows that the tests were well safeguarded, that
they were temporary in duration and occupied a minimal and relatively unused portion of the
high seas, that they were appropriately based from "strategic" trust territories with adequate
safeguards for the native population, that the United States paid adequate compensation
(although disclaiming legal liability) to certain interests in the area adversely affected by the
tests, and that the tests were conducted on behalf of the nuclear security interests not only of the
United States but also of a number of other "free world" nations.FN68 These arguments would
well accord with the view of customary law in the present study. For if we start with a customary
rule of "freedom of the seas" defined as a pressure upon national decision-makers, the rule was
vindicated by the conduct of the United States in using the high seas for nuclear testing. There is
no need to invoke "complementary" prescriptions to arrive at this result, any more than a fishing
fleet would have to invoke "temporary exclusive jurisdiction" as a complementary prescription to
"freedom of the seas" if fishing vessels from another state attempted to maneuver in between
their vessels. For the rule of free seas means that one fishing party has the freedom for a
temporary exclusive use in the immediate area of its vessels; what it does not mean is that any
single country can "rope off" a portion of the high seas for exclusive fishing permanently. In
short, the rule of free seas creates a pressure upon users to allow for the free use of the seas by
others, such allowance sometimes entailing temporary exclusive jurisdictions. As Professor
McDougal seems to concede by implication, the American tests would not have been legal had
the United States claimed the area as a permanent testing ground. For that would have violated
the norm of freedom of the seas, even though it might possibly have been justifiable on the
grounds of national security interests and certainly justifiable if a set of prescriptions relating to
exclusive use of the high seas were complementary in all respects to the set characterized as
"freedom of the seas."FN69
A second, more basic objection to the doctrine of complementary prescriptions is its
mistaken focus upon rationalization rather than [pg26] action. Custom in international law
depends upon what states do, and in terms of their practice contradictory lines of conduct do not
arise nearly as frequently as do contradictory explanations. While a proper reliance upon the acts
(or omissions) of states sharpens the characterization of customary legal rules, a shift to a
subjective notion of complementarity tends to make it possible for any nation to justify anything.
Moreover, Professor McDougal unnecessarily complicates the concept of custom by taking an
interests approach. He looks to the rationalizations of decision-makers in terms of their interests
rather than just at the conduct itself. Yet once these rationalizations are invoked, it becomes easy
to find among them many sets of complementary prescriptions. Lawyers the world over are
clever enough to articulate a set of values, rationalizations, and interests (particularly those as
simple as the well-being of the nation or as vague and all-inclusive as "security," one of
McDougal's choice nominees) for anything that their client's states want to do. Thus, whenever
there is a claim-conflict situation we should not be surprised to find lawyers on each side
invoking a set of prescriptions that, taken together, are complementary. Further, we should not be
surprised to find each side asserting that its view of the matter is the only "reasonable" one.
Professor McDougal himself plays the role of advocate in his far-ranging search to find
prescriptions complementary to those of freedom of the seas. In his essay he cites the territorial
sea, the contiguous zones, and the continental shelf as examples of the predominance of
exclusive use. But none of these areas was involved in the actual hydrogen bomb testing zone,
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which was the concrete issue in the essay. The fact that the "high seas" are bordered by territorial
seas and in part coincide with contiguous zones does not necessarily change the character of the
rules pertaining to the area that is conceded to be "high seas," while the rules pertaining to the
continental shelf below seem as irrelevant as those pertaining to the air above. The "exclusive
interests" of the coastal state in the territorial waters of course contrast with the freedom of the
high seas, but happily they relate to two entirely different geographical areas. Such prescriptions
are complementary only in an artificial sense, and not in the concrete sense relevant to the
hydrogen bomb tests. If they were relevant, then it would be equally permissible to cite mare
liberum as an excuse for violating aer clausus and vice versa.
Professor McDougal much more persuasively cites "naval maneuvers, military exercises,
and other peacetime defensive activities" in support of the hydrogen bomb tests. FN70 For these
have been conducted on the high seas and constitute a real precedent for larger testing programs.
Similarly, they indicate the compatibility of temporary exclusive appropriations of portions of
the high seas with the norm of freedom of the seas. They also indicate the importance of
establishing [pg27] clear warning zones in areas off the main navigational and fishing routes.
However, Professor McDougal mentioned these precedents only in passing, without devoting
much analysis to them; rather, he spent most of his legal analysis on territorial seas and
contiguous zones, which are only superficially related to the "high seas."
The idea of complementary prescriptions in some cases seems to have an explanatory
power at a high level of abstraction, but when related to specific instances is not helpful in
deciding concrete cases. An example is Professor McDougal's analysis of the laws of warfare,
which he finds fall between the complementary policies of military necessity and
humanitarianism.FN71 This example is especially instructive because Professor McDougal
synthesizes the complementary prescriptions in the generalization that warfare must be
conducted so that there is a "minimum destruction of values."FN72
Although Professor McDougal proceeds to list his versions of what this generalization
would entail with respect to combatants, areas of operation, weapons, objects of attack, reprisals,
superior orders, prisoners of war, and so forth, it is never clear how instances could be resolved
when belligerents disagree as to the weights they might assign to their values. What might seem
to the outside observer (who is not privy to many of the critical facts) as a squandering of
military power might appear to the belligerent as an attempt to end the war sooner by
terrorization of the opponent. Indeed, Professor McDougal acknowledges in a footnote that
"terror bombing...might conceivably result in less aggregate destruction of values than other
alternatives in the application of violence."FN73 So too, a belligerent might decide that express
violation of the rules of warfare as laid down by the Geneva Conventions or as accepted in
general practice might terrorize the opponent; in that instance, Professor McDougal's over-riding
value justification for military conduct might contravene any and all rules of warfare, including
customary rules and those rules accepted by Professor McDougal.
It is significant that in his work of over 800 pages on the laws of war, Professor
McDougal adverts only once, in a footnote, to the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
He does so without relating the example to his analysis and concludes only that it is a "difficult"
example.FN74 From the American point of view, these bombings were clearly necessary to
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promote in the long run the "minimum [pg28] destruction of values" by bringing the war to a
quick conclusion. Yet can an impartial observer, applying Professor McDougal's approach, reach
the same conclusion? Was it necessary, one might ask, to demonstrate the overwhelming power
of the atomic bombs by dropping them on population centers rather than on an offshore island?
Was the Nagasaki bomb, as distinct from the Hiroshima bomb, necessary for any conceivable
military or demonstration purpose? And did the bombings bring about a peace treaty that was
significantly different from the terms offered by the Japanese in the summer of 1945? The
relevant factor here is not what the impartial observer might conclude, but the impossibility of
applying a standard such as the one suggested by Professor McDougal to a specific act, such as
the atomic bombing of Japan. Subsequent observers may disagree with prior policy-makers, and
a definitive answer to the question of "minimal" destruction cannot be rendered until after the
event, if at all. Thus the wartime leaders could not have access to any rational standard for
deciding at the time whether certain policies are legal or illegal. To adopt Professor McDougal's
"reasonableness" approach to the rules of warfare would ensure the uselessness of those rules. It
would make a self-fulfilling prophecy of his statement that the rules of warfare merely "guide the
attention of decision-makers to significant variable factors in typical recurring contexts of
decision."FN75
Of course, if national decision-makers in wartime in fact treat rules of warfare as mere
attention-getting devices, we must acknowledge that fact. But examination of state practice in
wartime demonstrates many instances where specific rules of warfare exerted pressure upon
decision-makers to comply with their prescriptions. This is not to say that the rules were always
obeyed, but rather that they were sometimes obeyed and when they were disobeyed the decision
was made with some calculation of the risks of disobedience. The degree of compliance with the
Hague and Geneva conventions on the rules of warfare varied from general to general as well as
from one theatre of operations to another. Yet all wars have instances of military commanders
complying with rules of warfare despite their own judgment that to do so increased the risk to
their own soldiers and slowed down the prosecution of the war. It is unnecessary to catalogue
specific cases; one striking instance can be found in Professor McDougal's volume on the law of
war. He cites memoranda prepared by the German Wehrmacht at the last stage of the war on a
proposal that Germany denounce its international obligations concerning the conduct of the war.
FN76 The Wehrmacht's conclusion was that there should be no denunciation, on the grounds
that:
[pg29] (1) Strictly formally, a denunciation of the agreements is not possible. The
conventions concerning P. W. and wounded provide for no denunciation, the Hague
Convention admits a denunciation only if one year's notice is given.
(2) On the basis of the practice of states in the wars of the last centuries, there
exists the "International Law of Usage" which cannot be done away with
unilaterally. It comprises the latest principles of a humane conduct of war; it is not
laid down in writing. To respect it is however considered a prerequisite for
membership [in] the community of states. (Prohibition on misusing the flag of
truce, killing of defenseless women and children, etc.)FN77
Although Professor McDougal cites this example to demonstrate "compelling testimony to the
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effectiveness of the sanction of self-interest,"FN78 it is clearly fruitless to attempt to distinguish
rules of international law on the observer's calculation of the states' self-interest. International
law as a whole is based upon the self-interest of states; if it were not, it would neither have arisen
nor survived. What is analytically more useful is to see in this example the pressure exerted by
the rules of warfare. Clearly some German military leaders contemplated denouncing the rules of
warfare, and asked the Wehrmacht's legal advisers for their opinion. The contemplated
denunciation would not have been a mere formality; clearly it would have been intended to
signal to certain German generals in the field that they no longer needed to respect the laws of
warfare, a signal which presumably would not have been effective if given informally in the
absence of an official denunciation. It is highly significant that the Wehrmacht concluded that
“Germany will by no means free herself from this essential obligation to the laws of war" by
such a denunciation. FN79 For this conclusion attests to the power not only of the rules of
warfare, but of the rule of international law relating to the effectiveness of a unilateral
denunciation of the rules of warfare. In short, something that was contemplated was not
undertaken because of legal advice, attesting to the pressure of the traditional rules of warfare.
Admittedly, many of these traditional rules are vague and are in need of updating. But
they do not appear nearly so vague as Professor McDougal's suggested standard of the
"minimum destruction of values." And, however wide the possible ambit of their interpretation,
they do not admit of the limitless area of discretion afforded by an [pg30] approach to customary
law that would characterize all rules of custom in terms of complementary prescriptions.
Despite these objections to Professor McDougal's arguments for "reasonableness" as the
central ordering factor in customary law, there remains an important sense in which
reasonableness is a reinforcing factor for the authoritativeness of custom. For nearly all acts that
states undertake appear to the actors as reasonable. If these same acts can in the future be cited as
precedents for rules of customary law, then the authoritativeness of such citation is enhanced by
the recognized reasonableness of the constitutive acts. Thus, reasonableness fails to provide an
adequate basis for the obligation underlying customary law; but it does contribute
psychologically to the pressure of customary rules upon the actors in the international system.
IV. CONCLUSION
Like consent and estoppel, the concept of reasonableness, while failing to provide an
adequate explanation of the source of obligation in customary international law, does play an
important psychological role in adding to the pressure of international norms upon states. The
result is to increase the sense of legality of the rules that are accepted by states as part of
"customary international law." This is not to say that each and every alleged rule of universal
international law must contain one or more of the elements of consent, estoppel, or
reasonableness in order for it to be "valid." "Validity" itself is only a psychological construct
subject to widely divergent "tests" among writers and publicists. There is no single reason why
international law, or any law for that matter, is or is not "valid"; the only operatively important
question is whether many or most of the laws in the legal system we are talking about work most
of the time. In the international system, as we have seen, a rule of law "works" if it exerts some
pressure upon national decision-makers to comply with its proscriptions (or, in what amounts to
the same thing, to recognize that opponent decision-makers are not changing the status quo
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politically if they persuasively clothe themselves in such rules). Why rules of international law
are effective in this manner is in part a function of consent, of estoppel, and of reasonableness,
and in part a function of many other things (e.g., morality, habit, effective sanctions, and so
forth). The time has surely come when writers should cease their attempts at single-factored
explanations of the "validity" of law, and attempt to understand legal phenomena in a manner
which to some may unfortunately be less logically rigorous or "deductive" but which at least
holds the promise of salvaging most of the delicate and often interlocking branches of the
subject. Logical rigor combined with single-factored analysis would chop away most of these
branches, leaving a well-defined trunk that bears less and less resemblance to reality. In
particular, in the [pg31] case of international customary law, rigid adherence to any of the three
factors discussed in this essay would leave few, if any, genuine rules of international customary
law to worry about.
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